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The NHS revolution: health care in the market place
Should the NHS follow the American way?
Cam Donaldson, Danny Ruta
Managed care and patient choice have many good points, but the NHS needs to adapt US methods
if it is to be efficient, free, and fair
The UK government seems to draw much of its inspira-
tion for health policy from the United States. Hence the
recent love affair with Kaiser Permanente’s care
pathways and the recent affirmation of the belief that
choice and payment by results will move England
towards a patient led NHS.1 Using evidence from the US
and Canada, we question this source of inspiration, raise
the possibility that the current policy trajectory will lead
to greater private financing of health care, and outline
why the United Kingdom should be wary of this. We
then suggest a solution to financing that retains some
aspects of managed care and current policy but rejects
others. Our solution recognises the cash limits of the
NHS and its twin goals of equity and efficiency.
Did managed care work in the US?
It is easy to interpret managed care in the US as having
led to greater efficiency in terms of outcomes and cost.2
However, managed care organisations like Kaiser Per-
manente have essential differences from the NHS.
Crucially, they operate in a free market without univer-
sal coverage. They are not obliged to take all comers;
patients who represent the “best risk” can be creamed
off by targeting groups who make low use of health
services. This practice is reinforced by relatively healthy
consumers self selecting into the lower cost plans
offered by managed care with little threat to their
health. Controlling for income or socioeconomic
group when comparing Kaiser with the NHS2 does not
adequately remove this source of bias.3–5 The best risk
people from high (or low) income groups will
somehow select into Kaiser, whereas the NHS has to
look after everybody.
Furthermore, Kaiser has developed a unique
culture in which doctors take corporate responsibility
for use of resources and give up a considerable degree
of clinical freedom.Only a certain type of doctor would
choose to work in such a culture, and Kaiser’s
recruitment process is careful to screen out those who
would not fit. Once again, a universal system such as
the NHS cannot afford to be so selective.
Thus, comparisons between Kaiser and the NHS
are difficult, and the relative inefficiency of the NHS is
likely to be more apparent than real. This also explains
why, at the whole system level, managed care in the US
has failed to control the nation’s overall health costs.6–8
With managed care offering lower cost plans to people
with low health costs and with higher risk (and thus
higher cost) people tending to remain in their
established plan, the costs at the level of the whole sys-
tem are not reduced. As regards quality of care and
outcomes, the detailed works of Miller and Luft have
shown, at best, mixed results from managed care.9 10
The NHS needs to consider carefully adoption of
Kaiser-type methods for chronic diseases. Although
some diseases may be suitable for a more integrated
approach, others may not.
From patient led NHS to user charges
The recent publication outlining the way to a patient
led NHS raises many questions about the extent to
which market forces and consumer demand will shape
health care and about the future role of commission-
ing.1 Patients will be offered a choice of secondary care
provider, with the supply side of the market freed up
through the independent sector and semi-
independent foundation trusts, in an attempt to make
health care more patient focused and more efficient.
Treatment at a US managed care organisation: patients seem to have
low risk of ill health
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The prerequisites for market driven efficiency,
however, are that price is determined by supply and
demand and that consumers’ ability and willingness to
pay, from their finite resources, in turn determines
demand. Yet price will be predetermined in the NHS
through a national tariff, and patients do not incur any
costs at the point of use. Competition, therefore, can
occur only through quality, which will be inflationary
unless an effective counterbalance to the power of
foundation trusts can be found. This counterbalance is
required to prevent more resources falling into the
black hole of the acute sector and may even be
required to divert resources from the acute sector to
primary and community care as well as public health
initiatives. It is also unclear how the effects of compet-
ing on quality will fit with a fixed tariff.
Another major failure of recent policy has been a
lack of recognition of cash limits and scarcity of
resources. Up to now, little serious attention has been
paid to encouraging primary care trusts to act as the
counterbalance and thus set priorities and control the
expenditure incurred by patient demand. Further
evidence of this comes from the fact that, despite the
NHS having received extra money to bring spending
up to the European average, many provider and
primary care trusts are running large, and perhaps
unrecoverable, deficits.11
Without further policy developments, the govern-
ment’s current scenario for a patient led NHS, whether
by accident or design, suggests a policy roadmap that
can only lead to user charges.1 We face the prospect of
an NHS led totally by patients, with supply responding
purely to consumer demand without any recognised
cap on expenditure and with a tariff system that under-
mines the market’s ability to achieve efficiency. The
result is a system that does not seem to stack up finan-
cially. With consumers bearing no financial respon-
sibility for their actions and primary care trusts simply
paying the bills, already strapped commissioners will
be pushed even further into deficit.
As little will exists to raise taxes, we foresee the emer-
gence of a new policy spin intended to ease the way for
user charges. Phrases such as the need to “diversify the
revenue stream” and for “new sources of revenue,” each
of which have been used recently in the Canadian con-
text,12 13 will be heard in the NHS policy debate. Patient
charges will quickly follow, either in the form of compul-
sory charges applicable across all services or as an
optional premium charge for additional services.
To see why we should not go down the road of user
charges we have only to look at the US system again.6
The healthcare system that has the greatest problems
controlling cost also has the greatest amount of user
charges. Although charges may choke off individual
demand among certain groups (those who are poorer
or not as healthy), they do not do so at the system level
because doctors will naturally provide even more ser-
vices for those who access them (the wealthier or less
needy). The demand that is choked off is not neces-
sarily trivial in health terms either. The seminal RAND
study of user charges which took place in the US dur-
ing the 1980s showed that clinically needed care is just
as likely to be cut back as care that is not needed.6
Charges simply lead to the system being as costly as
before but meeting less need. The bureaucracy
required to avoid such adverse effects, by creating
exemptions, is unlikely to be justified in terms of
revenue earned.
Although to some extent we already have a
multitiered system, the more services that are opened
up to private payment, the more diverse will be the
quality of those services, in both clinical and hotel
terms. The most vulnerable in society would inevitably
receive services at the lower end of the market, which
would no longer be accessed by the vocal middle class.
And it is the middle class who currently win
improvements for all NHS patients by being locked
into the same system of financing services.
Of course, society may be comfortable with a
system of user charges. If so, the NHS could be in
deeper trouble than even we suggest. There is little evi-
dence of what would be acceptable to the population in
this regard, although it has been claimed that those
who advocate user charges tend to be those who stand
to gain most from their introduction—in this case, the
healthy and wealthy.14
Is there an alternative?
On the assumption that the public wants to avoid user
charges, we propose a system that retains some
elements of managed care and recent policy but rejects
others. Our starting point is evidence that the advent of
the purchaser-provider split in the UK led to greater
awareness of standards and costs.15 Fundholding
resulted in an important change in the role of general
practitioners, increasing their involvement in many
decisions about service provision. Recent evidence
suggests that fundholding had a positive effect on wait-
ing times.16 Such effects probably arose because
general practitioners were able to negotiate from a
position of strength, not just financially but because of
their professional status. If we want a patient led NHS
that remains free at the point of use, but with some
handle on the purse strings, then practice based com-
missioning with genuine responsibility for financial
management is the way forward. It would be similar to
fundholding, which was modelled on managed care
but more explicitly recognised the cash limits of the
NHS. This is how we can realise the potential benefits
of US managed care models but avoid their pitfalls.
More specifically, we believe that the concept of an
integrated primary and secondary health and social care
organisation, or superpractice, holds out the greatest
promise for a 21st century NHS. Superpractices would
receive public funding for and serve populations of
25 000-30 000. As well as primary care professionals
with the appropriate skill mix, they would also provide
ambulatory secondary care specialists, who could be
employed, partners, or contracted in from hospitals.
Such organisations could provide their own inpa-
tient secondary care, perhaps through the development
of community hospitals, or operate a mixed arrange-
ment of leased beds (staffed by their own clinicians) and
commissioned secondary care from other providers.
They would be free to commission more specialised sec-
ondary and tertiary care and diagnostic and other serv-
ices from foundation trusts or independent sector
providers.National tariffs and guaranteed throughput in
the independent sector would be abandoned to allow
superpractices to negotiate the best possible price and
quality within their finite budgets. Patients would be
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encouraged to exercise choice and consumer power by
moving between these integrated care organisations,
rather than through their choice of secondary or tertiary
care providers.
To prevent superpractices creaming off low risk,
low cost patients, the NHS would need to develop a
more sophisticated risk adjusted resource allocation
formula. This could use the data now routinely
collected at practice level by the new quality outcomes
framework—for example, smoking status, body mass
index, and blood pressure. National bodies will still be
required to assess performance and conduct other
monitoring, and both national and regional bodies
would provide the technical and infrastructure support
for assessing needs and setting priorities. Methods and
criteria for managing scarcity and improving services
could also be developed at this level but adapted locally
with community and partnership agencies.17
Conclusion
Current government policy and US managed care
have many good points. Building on these, our
proposed model of integrated care, rooted in genuine
practice based commissioning, would make it much
easier to control overall NHS costs and manage
scarcity without compromising clinical standards or
equity. If foundation trusts take over and develop these
roles, more emphasis is likely to be placed on acute
care and demand would be supply rather than patient
and primary care led. Our proposals bring the
counterbalance that is needed, while recognising cash
limits. They would safeguard the founding principles
of the NHS and guarantee its continuation as an asset
for the twin goals of economic efficiency and social
justice in Britain.
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Summary points
Current UK health reforms could end up with
patients paying privately for more of their care
A managed care approach is unlikely to increase
NHS efficiency without explicit recognition of
cash limits and selective adoption of models for
specific diseases
An integrated system of care with a focus on
general practice based commissioning would
prevent too much emphasis on acute care
To make competition work the national tariff
needs to be scrapped
Patient choice should be shifted from secondary
care organisations to new community based
integrated care organisations which provide or
commission all services for their patients
Corrections and clarifications
The parents’ journey: continuing a pregnancy after a
diagnosis of Patau’s syndrome
An editorial oversight led to the names of two
authors being left out of this clinical review by
Locock (BMJ 2005;331:1186-9, 19 Nov). Jane
Crawford and Jon Crawford should have appeared
as coauthors under the article title. We apologise to
all three authors.
Self management of oral coagulation: randomised trial
A observant rapid respondent spotted that the
abstract of this paper by Fitzmaurice and
colleagues (BMJ 2005;331:1057-9, 5 Nov) should
say that intervention patients used a point of care
device to measure international normalised ratio
every two weeks, rather than twice a week.
Height and mortality from cancer among men:
prospective observational study
When preparing an update to this analysis by
Davey Smith and colleagues (BMJ 1998;317:
1351-2), the authors realised that a computer
program miscoding had occurred for cancers
related or unrelated to smoking. They had
originally reported that greater height was
associated with increased risk of cancers unrelated
to smoking, but not cancers related to smoking.
They have now found that, although the overall
association between height and cancer mortality
remains, there is no material difference in the
strength of the association with cancers related to
smoking or those unrelated to smoking. Full details
of the reanalysis are available in the report of the
updated analysis (Batty GD, Shipley MJ,
Langenberg C, Marmot MG, Davey Smith G. Adult
height in relation to mortality from 14 cancer sites
in men in London (UK): evidence from the
original Whitehall study. Ann Oncol 2005 Oct 25
[epub ahead of print]).
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